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SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
AND JURISDICTION
A.

List of parties.
The parties are identified on the caption of the case.

B.

Statement of Jurisdiction.
This Court has discretionary jurisdiction of this case pursuant to: (1)

Article VIII, § 3 of the Utah Constitution; (2) Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) and (5)
(1996); and (3) Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The following issues are presented by this appeal, together with applicable
review standards and citation to lower court record, showing the preservations
below:
Issue 1.

Does the legislative body of the City have the lawful

authority to pass an ordinance protecting women, children and other members of
the general public from unwittingly being exposed to sexual or other acts of
indecency, when these citizens are in places they have a lawful right to be,
regardless of whether someone else might believe a citizen's presence would be
"unlikely"?
A.

Review Standard. Issue reviewed under a correctness of law

standard, without deference to the lower court ruling. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT
10; 994 P.2d 1243, 1245; Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, 991 P. 2d 67, 69.
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B.

Issue Preservation. This issue was included in the City's Brief of

Appellee before the Court of Appeals, at 6-8, and in all arguments
Issue 2.

Did a divided panel of the Court of Appeals err when, without

a statutory or constitutional requirement to do so, it failed to: (a) apply the "plain
meaning" rule of statutory construction to a City ordinance; (b) construe the
ordinance to implement legislative intent; and (c) give the ordinance a
presumption of validity?
A.

Review Standard. Issue reviewed under a correctness of law

standard, without deference to t he lower court ruling. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT
10; 994 P.2d 1243, 1245; Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, 991 P. 2d 67, 69.
B.

Issue Preservation. The question underlying this issue, meaning of

"place open to public view" was considered by the trial court (Tr. pp. 27-31).
Defendant-Roberts was convicted in the trial court, and he appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals was briefed on the issue of the meaning of
"place open to public view" in the City's ordinance (Brief of Appellant Keith
Roberts to Court of Appeals, at pp. 6-20; City's Brief of Appellee, at pp. 6-8). The
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on its own redefinition of "place
open to public view." 2000 UT 201; 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24. This Court
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, not the trial court. The City
presented this issue in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court.
Issue 3.

Did a divided panel of the Court of Appeals err when it

substituted its view of public policy for that of the duly constituted legislative
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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body of the City and, thereby, authorized the commission of acts of prostitution
and indecency on streets, sidewalks, parks and private land (open to the public and
business invitees), so long as the City cannot prove that such activity is "likely" to
be seen by the general public?
A.

Review Standard. Issue reviewed under a correctness of law

standard, without deference to the lower court ruling. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT
10; 386 Utah Adv. Rep. 57; Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, 991 P. 2d 67, 69.
B.

Issue Preservation. The question underlying this issue, meaning of

"place open to public view" was considered by the trial court (Tr. pp. 27-31).
Defendant-Roberts was convicted in the trial court, and he appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals was briefed on the issue of the meaning of
"place open to public view" in the City's ordinance (Brief of Appellant Keith
Roberts to Court of Appeals, at pp. 6-20; City's Brief of Appellee, at pp. 6-8). The
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on its own redefinition of "place
open to public view." 2000 UT 201; 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24. This Court
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, not the trial court. The City
presented this issue in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court.

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND ORDINANCES
The relevant constitutional, statutory, and ordinance provision under
discussion in this appeal are as follows:
Salt Lake City Code § 11.16.010(M) states in pertinent
part:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

M. "Place open for public view" means an area
capable of use or observance by persons from the
general community, where an expectation of privacy
for the activity engaged in by individuals is not
reasonably justified.
Salt Lake City Code § 11.16.010(P) states in pertinent
part:
P. "Sexual conduct" means human masturbation,
sexual intercourse, or any touching of the covered or
uncovered genitals, human female breast, pubic areas
or buttocks of the human male or female, whether
alone or between members of the same or opposite sex
or between humans and animals in an act of apparent
sexual stimulation or gratification, which term shall
include, but not be limited to fellatio, cunnilingus,
pederasty and bestiality.
Salt Lake City Code § 11.16.100 states:
11.16.100 Urinating in public and other disorderly
conduct.
It is unlawful for any person, while in a place open to
public view, to willfully:
A.
Urinate or stool;
B.
Engage in sexual conduct, alone or with
another person or an animal;
C.
Make an intentional exposure of his or
her genitals, pubic area, buttocks or any portion of the
areola and/or nipple of the female breast;
D.
Exhibit the private parts of any horse,
bull or other animal in a state of sexual stimulation, or
to exhibit such animals in the act of sexual copulation.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-41 states in pertinent part:
(1)
Boards of commissioners and city councils of
cities may suppress and prohibit the keeping of
disorderly houses, houses of ill fame or assignation, or
houses kept by, maintained for, or resorted to or used
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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by, one or more persons for acts of perversion,
lewdness, or prostitution within the limits of the city
and within three miles of the outer boundaries thereof,
and may prohibit resorting thereto for any of the
purposes aforesaid; they may also make it unlawful for
any person to commit or offer or agree to commit an
act of sexual intercourse for hire, lewdness, or moral
perversion within the city, or for any person to secure,
induce, procure, offer, or transport to any place within
the city any person for the purpose of committing an
act of sexual intercourse for hire, lewdness, or moral
perversion, or for any person to receive or direct or
offer or agree to receive or direct any person into any
place or building within the city for the purpose of
committing an act of sexual intercourse for hire,
lewdness, or moral perversion, or for any person to
aid, abet, or participate in the commission of any of the
foregoing....
(2)
(a)
A woman's breast feeding, including
breast feeding in any place where the woman
otherwise may rightfully be, does not under any
circumstance constitute an obscene or lewd act,
irrespective of whether or not the breast is covered
during or incidental to feeding.
(b)
Boards of commissioners and city
councils of cities may not prohibit a woman's breast
feeding in any location where she otherwise may
rightfully be, irrespective of whether the breast is
uncovered during or incidental to the breast feeding.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-50 states:
(1)
Boards of commissioners and city councils of
cities may provide for the punishment of any person or
persons for:
(a)

disturbing the peace or good order of the

city;
(b)
persons;
(c)

disturbing the peace of any person or
disturbing any lawful assembly;
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(d)
public intoxication;
(e)
challenging, encouraging, or engaging in
fighting;
(f)
using obscene or profane language in a
place or under circumstances which could cause a
breach of the peace or good order of the city;
(g)
engaging in indecent or disorderly
conduct;
(h)
engaging in lewd or lascivious behavior
or conduct in the city; and
(i)
interfering with any city officer in the
discharge of his duty.
(2)
Boards of commissioners and city councils of
cities may provide for the punishment of trespass and
such other petty offenses as the board of
commissioners or city council may consider proper.
(3)
(a)
A woman's breast feeding, including
breast feeding in any location where she otherwise
may rightfully be, does not under any circumstance
constitute a lewd or indecent act, irrespective of
whether or not the breast is covered during or
incidental to feeding.
(b)
Boards of commissioners and city
councils of cities may not prohibit a woman's breast
feeding in any location where she otherwise may
rightfully be, irrespective of whether the breast is
uncovered during or incidental to the breast feeding.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 states:
10-8-84. Ordinances, rules, and regulations - Passage Penalties.
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for
carrying into effect or discharging all powers and
duties conferred by this chapter, and as are necessary
and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the
health, and promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace and good order, comfort, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the
protection of property in the city; and may enforce
obedience to the ordinances with fines or penalties as
they may deem proper, but the punishment of any
offense shall be by fine not to exceed the maximum
class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301 or
by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by both
the fine and imprisonment.
U.S. Const. Amendment IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Defendant-Roberts was charged with having committed Disorderly
Conduct, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code Section
11.16.100. On August 30, 1999, following a bench trial, the trial judge found
Defendant-Roberts guilty as charged. On appeal, on June 29, 2000, the Utah
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to apply the
law set forth in its opinion to the evidence, to determine whether DefendantRoberts's conduct was "open to public view." On August 7, 2000, before the trial
court could consider the case on remand, Appellant Salt Lake City (the "City")
petitioned this Court for a Writ of Certiorari, which this Court granted on October
20, 2000.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

1.

On the evening of July 9, 1999, Officers Anthony Russell and

Shawn Player of the Vice Squad of the Salt Lake City Police Department were
working on south State Street when they observed a known prostitute approach
several cars, the last of which she entered. The car then drove away. Police
officers followed the vehicle, which was driven by Defendant-Roberts.
Transcript, pp. 6-8, 15, 26.
2.

The officers followed Defendant-Roberts's car to the area of 1300

South and 500 West underneath the viaduct, which is a popular place of
assignations and for the police to apprehend prostitutes. Defendant-Roberts was
apparently spooked by a marked police car that drove by. Thereafter, the car left
the viaduct area and drove to 900 West and 1860 South, where Defendant-Roberts
parked it in a bar's back parking lot. Tr., p. 9.
3.

After parking their vehicles in front of the bar, the officers walked

around the bar and observed the back parking lot of the bar. Tr., p. 10.
4.

The officers described the area as "open to public view," and

observed that the parking lot went all around the bar, until it met an adjacent
business in the back. Tr., p. 10.
5.

The parking lot was open for public parking; thus, anybody could

walk into that area. The officers observed people coming out of the bar and going

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to their cars in the parking lot. Tr., pp. 123 25-26.l
6.

The officers observed that Defendant-Roberts had parked in the

parking lot, between a parked flatbed truck and the wall of the adjacent business
building. The car was next to a chain link fence to the west and south. Tr., pp. 12,
20, 24.
7.

Officer Russell went under the flatbed truck and approached to

within 15 to 20 feet of the car. He did not have to go under the truck to get to the
area where Defendant-Roberts was located, but did so to remain undetected by
Defendant-Roberts. Tr., pp. 12, 14, 17-18,21. From that vantage point, Officer
Russell could see into the back window of the car. He saw the prostitute lift her
shirt, exposing her breasts, and saw Defendant-Roberts put his mouth to the
woman's breasts. Tr., p. 15; Video Transcript, 5:03:02 - 5:04:21.
8.

Officer Russell then approached the passenger side of the car,

knocked on the window and showed his badge and identified himself. From that
position, Officer Russell could see that the woman's shirt was still up and
Defendant-Roberts's pants were down. His penis was exposed. Tr., p. 16.
1

At trial, Officer Russell drew a diagram to explain his testimony. The diagram is
found in the videotape transcript of the trial. The video transcript is in the Court
record. Two still photographs of the video transcript showing the diagram are
attached as Exhibit "B" showing time sequences 5:02:33 and 5:02:37. The top of
the diagram is west. From the top of the diagram down, Officer Russell indicated
a two story cinderblock building behind the bar, Defendant-Roberts's vehicle, a
flat bed trailer (below and to the right of Defendant-Roberts's car), additional
parking, and the bar. Officer Russell drew a line indicating his path to the flat bed
trailer. Tr., pp. 13, 14; Video Transcript 5:02:29 - 5:03:01; see also still photos of
5:02:33 and 5:02:37, Exhibit "B;" Tr., p. 19. There is also a road to the north with
an entrance to the parking lot. Tr., pp. 19, 20; Video Transcript 5:07:52 - 5:08:18.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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9.

The area from which Officer Russell was looking into Defendant-

Roberts 5s car was an area that anybody from the public could walk to and enter.
While Defendant-Roberts and the prostitute were in the parking lot, several other
cars were parked there, and numerous people came out of the bar and walked
through the parking lot to get to those cars. Tr., pp. 16-17, 20-22, 25-26; Video
Transcript, 5:09:41 - 5:10:05; Video Transcript 5:05:12 - 5:05:50, 5:08:48 5:08:53.
10.

There were at least three ways for the public to walk back to where

Defendant-Roberts had parked his car. A person could walk in from the road,
from the parking lot or from the southeast of Defendant-Roberts's vehicle. Tr., p.
21; Video Transcript, 5:09:41 - 5:10:05.
11.

Officer Player arrested Defendant-Roberts for disorderly conduct,

pursuant to Salt Lake City Code § 11.16.100. After a bench trial, DefendantRoberts was found guilty by Third District Court Judge David Young. Tr., p. 31.
12.

The trial court concluded that the events took place in a public

parking lot. The trial court also ruled that a public parking lot is a place open to
public view because the public could move around in and'out of the building and
into the parking lot where the illegal acts took place. Tr., p. 30.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A.

City acted within its enabling power; however, Court of Appeals

improperly judicially amended a clear City ordinance by adding a new
condition that the offensive conduct must be in a place "likely" to be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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observed.
The legislative body of Salt Lake City enacted an ordinance in which it
sought to protect the general public from unwittingly being exposed to acts of
lewdness or indecency in any place in which the general public has a lawful right
to be. The City Council used the unambiguous phrase "place open to public view"
to communicate this legislative intent, and defined the phrase in the ordinance.
The Court of Appeals ignored the plain meaning rule for determining
legislative intent and5 instead, judicially legislated its own public policy judgment
by, in effect, amending the City's ordinance to require that the indecent acts be
performed in a place where it is "likely" they will be observed.
The Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the City has the enabling
power to enact such police power laws. It also failed to follow this Court's
instructions that such City powers are to be read broadly and are presumptively
valid. In addition, the Court of Appeals failed to apply Utah precedent, from the
Fourth Amendment context, regarding the meaning of "open to public view."
The result of the Court of Appeals's decision is that, if this ruling is upheld,
the City will be powerless to protect the public from being unwittingly exposed to
sexual and other indecent conduct in places in which they lawfully have a right to
be, if someone might subjectively believe it was not likely that people would be
passing by. That result contradicts the clear legislative intent of the City Council,
acting within its lawful powers granted by the State Legislature and constitutional
law. It is also bad public policy.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B.

Guidance of Fourth Amendment cases; misconstruction of facts.

In its Fourth Amendment cases, this Court has defined "place open to
public view" in terms of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Two members of the
Court of Appeals panel erroneously held that those cases do not support the City's
interpretation of its disorderly conduct ordinance. The Court of Appeals also
misconstrued certain uncontested facts in this case by not viewing them in a light
most favorable to supporting the judgment of the trial judge. This error should be
corrected.
ARGUMENT
POINT L
THE CITY'S LEGISLATIVE BODY LAWFULLY
ACTED WITHIN ITS ENABLING POWER WHEN
IT ENACTED AN ORDINANCE TO PROTECT
THE GENERAL PUBLIC FROM UNWITTINGLY
BEING EXPOSED TO SEXUAL ACTIVITY.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN JUDICIALLY
AMENDING THAT ORDINANCE BY ADDING A
NEW CONDITION AND SUBSTITUTING ITS
JUDGMENT REGARDING PUBLIC POLICY.
A.

City enabling power and presumption of validity.

The duly constituted legislative body of the City enacted an ordinance
designed to control acts of prostitution and protect the general public from
unwittingly being exposed to sex and other acts of indecency. In relevant part the
ordinance provides:
It is unlawful for any person, while in a place open to
public view, to willfully:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(A)

...

(B) Engaged in sexual conduct, alone or with
another person or animal]
(C) Make an intentional exposure of his or her
genitals, pubic area, buttocks or any portion of the
areola and/or nipple of the female breast,
(D)

...

§ 11.16.100 Salt Lake City Code (emphasis added). The ordinance also defines
the term "sexual conduct" to include sexual intercourse, the touching of the
uncovered genitals or the female human breast or pubic areas, when done in the
context of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification. § 11.16.010 Salt Lake City
Code.
Facially, this police power enactment was drafted to protect the unwitting
public from being exposed to the specified offensive acts, when these citizens are
in areas where they had a lawful right to be. It also provides law enforcement with
a tool in the fight against prostitution.
State enabling law grants to cities the power to enact such laws that are
"necessary and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the health, promote
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of the property in
the city...." § 10-8-84 Utah Code Ann., 1953. More specifically, State law
provides that cities may prohibit prostitution and "lewdness, or moral perversion
within the city," § 10-8-41(1), Utah Code Ann., 1953, and may provide for the
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punishment of persons for "engaging in indecent or disorderly conduct" or
"engaging in lewd or lascivious behavior or conduct in the city/' § 10-8-50, Utah
Code Ann., 1953.
In construing this State enabling power section, this Court clearly rejected
the old Dillon Rule and ruled that local governmental police powers should be
broadly construed. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980); Dairy
Product Services, Inc. v. City ofWellsville, 2000 UT 81, 405 Utah Adv. Rep. 23,
26. This Court has also ruled that these powers specifically include the right to
prohibit prostitution and allied activities. Salt Lake City v. Alfred, 437 P.2d 434
(Utah 1968); Hollingsworth v. City of South Salt Lake City, 624 P.2d 1149 (Utah
1981).
The United States Supreme Court recently upheld that principle, even in the
context of a free speech challenge. It said "there is nothing objectionable about a
city passing a general ordinance to ban public nudity. . . . " City of Erie v. Pap's
AM, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 1394 (2000).
In sum, this Court has consistently ruled that the general police powers of
cities are to be read broadly. Ordinances enacted thereunder are presumptively
valid. The challenger to a city ordinance has the burden of proof to establish, by a
heightened level of judicial scrutiny, that a challenged law is incompatible with a
particular legal or constitutional provision. That is, the presumptions of validity
and constitutionality attach to municipal ordinances as strongly as they do to State
legislative enactments. Thus, the courts will interfere with a City's legislative
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decisions only when they are "capricious and arbitrary," lacking any rational basis
for support, or are "wholly discordant to reason and justice." State v. Packer, 297
P.2d 1013, 1016 (Utah 1931); State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952); Salt
Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1037 (Utah 1975), cert, denied 425 U.S. 915,
47 L.Ed. 2d 766 (1975); City ofMonticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah
1990); 5 McQuillin Municipal Corporations § 19.06 (3rd Rev. Ed.); Triangle Oil v.
North Salt Lake City Corp., 609 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1980).
These concepts were well summarized by Professor McQuillin in his
respected treatise on municipal corporations wherein it is observed:
No ordinance or law will be declared unconstitutional
unless clearly so, and every reasonable [effort] will be
made to sustain it. Not only must unconstitutionality
appear clear, but, it has been asserted, it must appear
and be proved beyond a reasonable d o u b t . . . . If the
constitutional questions raised are fairly debatable, the
court must declare the ordinance constitutional, as the
court cannot and must not substitute its judgment for
that of the local legislative body,
5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 19.06 at pp. 377-78 (3rd Rev. Ed. Rev)
(emphasis added). Similarly, this Court observed:

It is well settled in this state, as elsewhere, that the
courts will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless
it clearly and manifestly violates some provision of the
constitution of the United States. Every presumption
must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of an
act, and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of its
validity, (citations omitted) The whole burden lies on
him who denies the constitutionality of a legislative
enactment.
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State v. Packer, 297 P.2d at 1016.
Respondent-Roberts did not meet these tests and the ordinance is valid and
enforceable, as written.
B.
Courts are required to construe an ordinance to implement
legislative intent using the law's plain meaning.
After determining that a city's legislative enactment is within the city's
enabling power and does not offend the Constitution, it is a court's duty to
construe the ordinance in accordance with the legislature's intent, as determined
by the law's plain language. This Court has clearly stated: "Generally, the best
indication of [legislative] intent is a statute's plain language'' Perrine v.
Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added).
In the instant case, two members of the Court of Appeals erred by not
applying the plain meaning rule, and thereby determining legislative intent, to the
phrase "place open to public view" in § 11.16.100 Salt Lake City Code.
C.
By judicial fiat a split panel of the Court of Appeals wrongfully
judicially amended a City ordinance and substituted its public policy
preference for that of the elected City legislature.
Defendant-Roberts claims that this matter should not be an issue before this
Court because, he asserts, the Court of Appeals upheld the City's right to enact an
indecent exposure ordinance. That claim is incorrect. The holding of the Court of
Appeals diminishes the City Council's ability to pass an ordinance that will be
interpreted according to its plain meaning. Further, it creates law that prevents the
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City's elected officials from making it illegal to engage in sex acts that can be
viewed by the non-consenting public in "places open to public view."
In enacting the Disorderly Conduct ordinance, the City used the words
"place open to public view." The phrase "place open for public view" was
defined by the City Council in Salt Lake City Code § 11.16.010(M) (1986). It
provides: "'[p]lace open for public view5 means an area capable of use or
observance by persons from the general community, where an expectation of
privacy for the activity engaged in by individuals is not reasonably justified."
That definition supports the City's position argued before the Court of
Appeals and taken before this Court in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Under
the definition, conduct occurs in a "place open for public view" if: (1) the place is
capable of either (a) use, or (b) observance, by persons from the general
community; and (2) the place is such that a reasonable expectation of privacy
could not be reasonable justified. Defendant-Roberts's situation clearly meets that
definition. The facts in the case at bar are not in dispute and demonstrate that the
public parking lot involved was capable of use by the public and was capable of
being observed by the public.
However, the divided panel of the Court of Appeals held that, in addition,
the conduct in such a place had to be "likely to be observed by a member of the
public." No such language appears in the ordinance definition, which instead
All of the parties, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals previously overlooked
the definition of "place open for public view" in Salt Lake City Code
§ 11.16.010(M).
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refers to a "reasonable expectation of privacy." This legislative definition is
consistent with Utah case law on this point. A person cannot have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an automobile parked in a parking lot open to the public.
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981). In that search and seizure case, this Court
held: "[f]or an officer to look at what is in open view from a position lawfully
accessible to the public cannot constitute an invasion of a reasonable expectation
of privacy." Id. at 51. (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, the ordinance definition is consistent with the better reasoned
case law from other jurisdictions. Those cases affirm that the legislature may
lawfully prohibit sexual conduct where it was "possible" to be observed by the
general public. They establish that such offensive behavior can occur in a "place
open to public view," even though actual observation of the conduct might be
"unlikely." For example, in Louisiana, a man was convicted of indecent exposure
for standing naked in front of a window of his own home, where he was visible
from the sidewalk outside, because it violated an ordinance that prohibited such
conduct where it was "open to public view." State v. Odom, 554 So.2d 1281 (La.
App. 1989).
Similarly, the State of New Mexico interpreted the words "public view" in
an indecency statute to mean a place that was "accessible or visible to the general
public." State v. Artrip, 811 P.2d 585 (N.M. App. 1991). The Michigan Court of
Appeals interpreted a statute that prohibited this type of sexual conduct in a
"public place." It held this term to mean that the legal review standard is "whether
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

there is a possibility that the unsuspecting public could be exposed to or view the
[sex] act." People v. Brown, 564 N.W.2d 919 (Mich. App. 1997) (emphasis
added); see also People v. Lino, 527 N.W.2d 434 (Mich. 1994). These well
reasoned decisions properly implemented the legislative intent and public policy
of protecting the unsuspecting and unwitting public, as opposed to rewriting the
statute or ordinance to protect perpetrators of offensive conduct.
The split panel of the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted the words
"place open to public view" in the disorderly conduct ordinance. It read this
phrase as if it was identical to "public place," and then added an additional
condition by judicial fiat and said that "open to public view" means that the City
must also prove that the conduct is "likely to be seen." In effect, the Court of
Appeals re-wrote the ordinance and adopted its own public policy preference.
This additional judicial requirement is contrary to the plain meaning of the
ordinance. In creating it, two members of the Court of Appeals subordinated the
City's legislative decision that the general public has a right to be free from
unwelcome exposure to sexual acts, when they are traveling in or about places
they have a lawful right to be. In this paradigm shift, the Court of Appeals created
new rights for prostitutes and other persons to willfully engage in sex acts or
indecent conduct in places "open to public view," so long as they or some thirdperson might subjectively determine that the conduct was "unlikely" to be seen by
members of the general public. Thus, the Court of Appeals panel substituted its
policy judgment for that of the City's legislative body and sacrificed the general
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public's right to be free of exposure to this offensive behavior.
In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals cited no Utah precedent and no
Constitutional principle. Rather, it cited inapplicable cases from other
jurisdictions which interpreted ordinance or statutory language dissimilar to Salt
Lake City's and which was more liberal to those engaging in sex acts and less
protective of the general public, because those laws prohibited this type of sexual
conduct only in "public places."3 None of the cases relied on by the Court of
Appeals majority opinion construed language similar to that used in the City's
ordinance, where the legislative decision was to protect the public and prohibit
offensive sexual conduct in a much broader venue: "places open to public view."
In the instant case, all of the foregoing principles of statutory construction
and respecting the role of the legislative branch of government were disregarded
by a majority of a panel of the Court of Appeals, over the vigorous and correct
dissent of Judge Bench. Thus, without reference to any constitutional violation,
the Court of Appeals judicially amended a lawful City ordinance, thereby
substituting its policy judgment for that of the duly elected legislative body of the
City. Id. This decision is clearly in error and must be reversed to enable the City
Council to perform its lawful duties under Utah constitutional and statutory law.

3

See discussion at 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 24. Notably, in two of the three cases
relied on by the two member majority of the Court of Appeals, the statutes
involved actually defined "public place" to mean a place where the conduct was
likely to be viewed by others. In contrast, Salt Lake City's ordinance does not use
that definition; instead, it uses one indicating a much broader meaning. The other
cases are, therefore, inapposite and distinguishable.
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In sum, in this case Defendant-Roberts engaged in sexual conduct in a
public parking lot, which was capable of both use and observance by the general
public. Under State v.Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981), Defendant-Roberts could not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile at such a location.
Therefore, Defendant-Roberts's conduct fell within the plain meaning of the
ordinance's definition of disorderly conduct, and the trial judge's conviction was
proper under law and should be affirmed. The Court of Appeals erred by
appending a "likely to be seen" component onto the elements of the crime; this
judicial appendage to the City ordinance must be corrected for future prosecutions
and the protection of the public's welfare.
POINT II
THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY DEFINED AN AREA WHICH IS
"OPEN TO PUBLIC VIEW" AS ONE WHICH IS VIEWED
"FROM A POSITION LAWFULLY ACCESSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC."
The plain meaning of the definition of "place open for public view" in the
City's ordinance is consistent with this Court's holding in Fourth Amendment
cases, in which this Court has defined the term "open to public view." In these
cases, this Court has held that an area is "open to public view" when it "is in open
view from a position lawfully accessible to the public...." State v. Lee, 633 P.2d
at 51; see also, State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132, 1136 (Utah 1989); State v.
Bradshaw, 680 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah 1984); State v. Shreve, 667 P.2d 590, 592
(Utah 1983).
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In Lee, this Court stated, "[i]t has long been the law that objects falling
within the plain view of an officer from a position where he is entitled to be are
not the subject of an unlawful search." This Court went on to state, ff[f]or an
officer to look at what is in open view from a position lawfully accessible to the
public cannot constitute an invasion of a reasonable expectancy of privacy." 633
P.2d at 51 (emphasis added).
While the Lee opinion was written in a search and seizure case, its analysis
is similar to the case at bar because it discusses a person's lawful expectation of
privacy in the context of what is open to public view. This case clearly holds that
a person has no expectation of privacy if he commits acts in a place where the
public is lawfully allowed. Notwithstanding this helpful and revelant holding, the
majority of the Court of Appeals panel disregarded this case and, instead, chose to
cite non-precedential and inapposite opinions from the states of New York, Hawaii
and Florida.
The irony of the Court of Appeals's two-member majority view is its
illogical inconsistency of policy. The United States and Utah Constitutions
provide a high level of protection to citizens from unreasonable searches by the
government; yet, those constitutions allow police seizures of property in places
"open to public view." In stark contrast, the Court of Appeals strangely concludes
that offensive sex acts are not subject to police action unless they meet a much
higher standard of being "likely" to be seen. Irrationally, the Court of Appeals
grants greater rights to persons engaging in illegal sex acts in places open to public
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view than it does to persons under police surveillance for other crimes. That is
nonsensical. More importantly, it may unwittingly create precedent for reopening
the current law on search and seizure standards.
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals unnecessarily creates a
conflict between the meaning of "open to public view" in the search and seizure
cases and the public indecency context. The City should be able to rely on
definitions set forth by this Court when creating its ordinances, especially in this
case where the City seeks to protect the general public from unwelcome exposure
to lewd or indecent behavior. The Court of Appeals's decision is in serious error
and contrary to controlling precedent of this Court; therefore, it should be
reversed.
POINT III
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS DO NOT PROVIDE
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS'
DECISION
In reaching its conclusion, the majority panel of the Court of Appeals recast
the facts in a light most favorable to its policy declaration. It did not construe the
facts in a light most favorable to supporting the verdict of a trial judge, who was
able to better evaluate the credibility and totality of the evidence. Although it is
not relevant to the serious legal errors made by the Court of Appeals, to place the
matter in factual context, this Court should be aware of the following uncontested
facts:
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(1)

The property where the offense occurred was private property. It

was a parking lot of a commercial establishment that was open for business. Thus,
the parking lot was an area to which the general public was lawfully entitled to be,
particularly for patrons of the businesses. (Facts Nos. 4, 5.)
(2)

The diagram attached as Exhibit "B" to this Brief was the one before

the trial judge. (See Fact No. 5.) It clearly demonstrates that the location of the
offensive conduct, subject of the criminal charge, was near a chain link fence and
the parked car in which the sex acts occurred. Thus, the illegal behavior could be
observed from the other side of the fence. Further, it occurred at a location to
which the general public had lawful access. The universe of citizens who could
have observed the sex acts included the owner of the trailer parked on the side of
Defendant-Roberts's car, any citizen taking a stroll, or anyone parking a car in the
vicinity. (See Facts Nos. 5, 9-10.)
(3)

One member of the police department was able to walk up to the

side of the vehicle in which the sex acts were being performed. Although much
was made in the Court of Appeals majority opinion that a police officer crawled
under a truck bed, that maneuver was not undertaken because of the difficulty of
access. Rather, it was undertaken to clandestinely approach the vehicle and
observe what was reasonably expected to be a sexual liaison between a known
prostitute and her "John." Contrary to the "spin" placed on it by the majority
opinion of the Court of Appeals, that maneuver did not suggest that the car was
parked other than in a place "open to public view." It was simply a lawful act
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performed by a law enforcement officer in order to observe conduct that could
have been seen by a member of the general public. (Facts Nos. 5, 7, 9-10.)
The Court of Appeals should have reviewed the trial court's findings of fact
under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994);
State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). However, it failed to do so, and, by
re-casting the facts, the Court of Appeals overstepped its authority in reviewing a
trial court's judgment.
In this case there was more than adequate evidence before the trial court to
sustain the guilty verdict, under the "open to public view" standard. Therefore,
this Court should reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the guilty verdict of
the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The erroneous ruling of the Court of Appeals poses a serious and
significant public policy concern. In essence, it requires the City to now prove a
subjective element of whether a given location would be one "likely" to be seen by
a member of the public. This new element gives prostitutes and others engaged in
indecent behavior a license to use many places open to public access for illegal
activity just because they are not in heavily traveled areas.
As a consequence, the public can expect to be affronted by offensive sexual
conduct when they are lawfully traveling in an area that is less used or at a late
hour. Therefore, the City will be powerless to protect those who take a stroll late
in the evening, at a location where some third-party subjectively believes it is not
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"likely" that people would be passing by. Also, viaducts, cul-de-sacs, parking lots
or other public ways will become late night "cribs" for prostitution.
The Court of Appeals usurpation of the legislative function must not be
allowed to stand. It interferes with the thoughtful legislative decisions of State and
local government. Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the panel
of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 5 ^day of December, 2000.

City Attorney
BOYD A. FERGUSON
Assistant City Attorney
RICHARD W. DAYNES
Assistant City Prosecutor
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opinion m this case, Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 35, and leaving the parking lot, and that anyone could
36-37 (Utah Ct App 1994)
- - *- ~ — ~*.
walk back to the area m the lot where the couple was
2. Treatment of this issue on remand would seem-to--be parked, which was behind two flatbed trucks. He
beyond the scope of our remand order. See Nelson, 872 ;
P.2dat37,38 However, ma way our prior opinion left this ! stated that the car was in an area that was "open to
view." However, to observe defendant and his
issue open for further discussion. We did conclude that public
j
Provo never held the land in fee simple, but held only legal companion without being spotted by them, the
title m trust for Provo's collective occupants as officers "parked in front of the bar so [defendant and
beneficiaries, see id. at 37, and we deemed it unnecessary his companion] couldn't see [the police] car and . . .
to decide whether Provo's interest in Old 900 South was a snuck around on foot and approached the car." One
determinable fee, see id. n.3 (H[W]e determine thatwhether ;officer then crawled underneath one of the flatbed
City's interest was that of a determinable fee or a fee simple, jtrucks to approach the car so he could not be seen.
the interest was held only m trust"). Still, past focus by the The officer testified that after emerging from under
parties and courts on the important question of Erovo's !
trusteeship leaves unturned a key to resolving~this. case: \ the flatbed truck he was standing "15 to 20 feet
Whether the nature of Provo's interest in the road-before ! away." The officer stated, "I could see into the back
vacation was a determinable fee, leaving a reversionary window. She was sitting in the passenger seat turned
toward him. I saw her lift her shirt, exposing her
interest in Landowners?
3. Based on our disposition, we need not address otHer j breasts. I saw the driver put his mouth to her breasts
issues raised by Landowners-i.e., the trial court's failure to . . . and that's when I approached the car from the
apply the law of the case or whether fee simple absolute back." The officer further testified that the trucks
title m Provo would be void under the Townsite Act,Also, "gave them a little bit of hiding room," that defendant
we have reviewed and decline Provo's jequest at oral and his companion were "somewhat hidden" behind
argument for reconsideration of our denial of its previous ( the trucks, and that no member of the public would be
motion for summary disposition. Finally, JEtoyq'lUted Jhe \
following issue in its brief, which was not raised by likely to crawl underneath the truck to observe
Landowners nor followed up on by Provo: "Was the district defendant's conduct However, the officer repeatedly
court's decision denying appellants' claim for damages due stated that a person could get to the area where^
to a taking by the city supported by the legal principles defendant had parked without crawling under the
governing the case?" We thus do not consider it
truck.
f 3 Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted
of disorderly conduct under section 11.16.100 of the
Cite a*
Salt Lake City Code.
398 Utah Adv. Rep. 23
ANALYSIS
I. City Ordinance
IN THE
T[4 Defendant first asserts the city ordinance under
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
which he was convicted is invalid because it does not
mirror the state statute governing lewdness. See Utat!
SALT LAKE CITY,
Code Ann. § 76-9-702 (1996). This is a question of
Plaintiff and Appellee,
law; thus, we review it for correctness. See State vj
v.
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996). The
Keith ROBERTS,
Utah Supreme Court has held that ordinances passed
Defendant and Appellant
by municipalities are valid unless they are
inconsistent or conflict with state law. See Redwood
No. 990876-CA
Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1138;
FILED: June 29,2000
1144 (Utah 1981); Salt Lake City v. Alfred, 20 Utaff
2000 UT App 201
2d 298,299,437 P.2d 434,435 (1968); see also Utah1
Code Ann. § 10- 8-84 (1999). Municipal ordinances
Third District, Salt Lake Department
and state law are not inconsistent when they share a
The Honorable William Barrett'
common purpose and are "closely related in subject
matter." Allred, 437 P.2d at 437. Furthermore, a
ATTORNEYS:
"municipal ordinance need not be identical to the
W. Andrew McCullough, Orem, for Appellant
controlling state statute to be consistent with it."
Richard W. Daynes, Salt Lake City, for
Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 90 (Utah Ct
Appellee
App. 1990). In this case, the fact that the language of
the Salt Lake City ordinance does not mirror the state
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme.
statute does not render the ordinance invalid. The
common purpose of both the city ordinance and state
This opinion is subject to revision before final
law is to prohibit sexual behavior m places where the
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
public may be affronted or offended. Compliance
with the city ordinance does not preclude compliance
BILLINGS, Judge:
with state law or vice versa. See Walker v Union Pacv
f 1 Defendant appeals his conviction for disorderly R.R. Co , 844 P 2d 335, 339-40 (Utah Ct. App. 1992%
conduct under Salt Lake City Code section 11.16.100. (holding city ordinance preempted by state l a \ ^
We affirm in part and remand with instructions.
because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed;'
FACTS
under state law). Accordingly, we affirm the tna£
Digitized
by the Howard
HunterCity
Law Library,
Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
t 2 Two
undercover
SaltW.Lake
police J.officers
court's conclusion that Salt Lake City Codef
may contain
fnllnwerl defendant's Machine-generated
car to a DarkineOCR,
lot behind
a barerrors.
I Ml. 16.100 is valid as it does not conflict with state*

av Kep. 23

Provo, Ut&H

support a finding that he "[e]ngage[d] m sexual traffic on the lane was offered," the court held "it was
conduct . . . with another person," as prohibited by improbable that [defendant's] acts would be observed
section 11.16.100(B) or "ma[d]e an intentional by members of the public" and reversed defendant^
exposure of his . . . genitals, pubic area, buttocks or conviction. State v. Broad, 600 P.2d 1379, 1379-82
any portion of the areola and/or nipple of the female (Haw. 1979).
breast," as prohibited by section 11.16.100(C).2 We f 9 As the Court of Appeals of New York pointed
review the trial court's factual findings under a clearly out, "it is necessary to interpret and apply the statute
erroneous standard. See State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d here in a manner that comports with its purpose.?
647, 648 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
People v. McNamara, 585 N.E.2d 788, 793 (N.Y.
f6 We conclude the facts before the trial court were 1991) (interpreting term "public place"). "That g
sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that member of the public may pass by is certainly part of
defendant "engaged in sexual conduct" within the the essence of a public place, and the harm to suchra
meaning of the ordinance. The Salt Lake City Code person's sensibilities is precisely that aimed at by the
defines "sexual conduct" as "human masturbation, statute. Conversely, where no such harm is likely, the
sexual intercourse, or any touching of the covered or statute is not violated." Id. Thus, we agree with the
uncovered genitals, human female breast, pubic areas New York court that "[s]exual acts performed in
or buttocks of the human male or female, whether parked cars . . . may be prosecuted [under thg
alone or between members of the same or opposite ordinance] when . . . the objective circumstances
sex." Salt Lake City Code § 11.16.010. Undisputed establish that the lewd acts committed there can and
trial testimony established that one of the arresting1 likely would be seen by a casual passerby." Id.
Defendant contends the fact that he parked his
officers saw defendant parked in his car kissing the f 10
exposed breasts of the woman he was with and saw car at night behind flatbed trucks in the rear area of
defendant's exposed genitals. This testimony the parking lot, which was bordered by a two-storj
sufficiently supported a finding of "sexual conduct." cement wall, a chain-link fence, and a closet}
business, does not support the trial court's conclusion
III. Place "Open to Public View"
1?
f7 Finally, defendant argues that he was improperly that he was "in a place open to public view."
convicted because he was not "in a place open to 111
In this case, the trial court concluded that thf
public view" when the sexual conduct occurred. See parking lot behind the bar was "open to public view'1
id. § 11.16.100. The trial court found defendant was under the ordinance. The court apparently relied upoS
"in a place open to public view" under the ordinance the fact that the conduct took place in a public*
because defendant "was [in] a public parking lot" parking lot, stating at trial, "I think the problem is that
when the conduct took place. Defendant claims the the language [of the ordinance] is tough to deal with,
district court's interpretation of the statutory language but I'm not going to struggle with it too much. It was,
was in'error. "Because a district court's interpretation a public parking lot, in my view, it was [therefore]
of a statute is a legal question, we review its ruling for open to public view." We conclude the trial judge
correctness." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1240 applied an incorrect legal standard equating a publig
parking lot to the statutorily required "place open to
(Utah 1998).
1(8 The relevant portion of the ordinance states: "It public view." A public parking lot, such as the on^
shall be unlawful for any person, while in a place behind the bar where defendant's conduct occurredf
open to public view, to willfully: . . . B. Engage in may or may not be a "place open to public view" for
sexual conduct, alone or with another person." Salt purposes of the ordinance. This determination turns
Lake City Code § 11.16.100. No Utah case has on the facts of each case. The key inquiry is whether
defined what constitutes "open to public view" under the conduct is likely to be observed by a member oji
the ordinance. However, in addressing similar the public. See Broad, 600 P.2d at 1381 (quoting
situations, other jurisdictions have emphasized the State v. Rocker, 475 P.2d 684, 688 (Haw. 1970)
fact-intensive nature of the inquiry. For example, the (stating that "the trier of fact is justified in finding th^
Appellate Court of Illinois held that consensual place public if the exposure is such that it is3likely t&
be seen by a number of casual observers")).
sexual activity in a city park
112
TTie record indicates that the officers had
near the lagoon, at seven o'clock in the
followed defendant's car to the bar; they had not
morning on the first of September, on a
merely passed by and spotted the activity. One officer
bright, sunshiny day, where people walked
saw defendant kissing the exposed breast of his
their dogs and jogged (as the defendant
companion, but only after the officer crawled under
himself was doing), and where the defendant
the flatbed truck, which the officer admitted would be*
not only could have been but in fact was seen
an unusual thing for a casual passerby or bar patron to"
by a police officer riding in an automobile on
do. However, the officers testified that numerous
an access road, was indeed [in] a "public
patrons were arriving and leaving the parking lot and
place" in that there was a high probability
that any of them could have walked to the area where
that the deviate conduct would be viewed by
defendant had parked his car. One officer further,
other members of the public.
State v. Bans, 305 N.E.2d 592, 593 (111. App. Ct. testified that he could see the conduct at issue when*
1973). In contrast, in a case involving sexual conduct standing fifteen to twenty feet away from the car.
occurring in a parked vehicle "in a turnaround area From the record before us, we cannot determine as a
opposite a residence" at 3:30 a.m., where "the car was matter of law whether defendant was or was not "in a
stationed between two street lights," where "no place open to public view." Accordingly, we remand*
persons other than the police officers saw [defendant,] this case to the trial court with instructions to apply,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Law School,
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set forth
m thisBYU.
opinion to the evidence,
and they themselves
would not have seen him had theJ.law
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they not followed him from Maunakea Street" anH

State v. Giro*, 943 P.2d 1114,1121 (Utah Ct. App.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
1997)' (remanding for trial court to re-examine
previously presented evidence Jl[b]ecause the trial
court was operating under a misunderstanding of the 1. Defendant additionally contends the terms of the
law"); State v Hansen, 857 P.2d 978, 982 (Utah Ct. ordinance make it unconstitutionally vague and thus void.
App. 1993) (remanding because trial court's findings However, defendant raises this argument for the first time
were inadequate for appellate court to determine on appeal. "[Issues raised for the first time on appeal will
be addressed only if the trial court proceedings
whether legal standard was properly applied),
demonstrated 'plain error.'" State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332,
CONCLUSION
333 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). Defendant has failed to
If 13
We affirm the trial court's conclusion that Salt demonstrate or even allege plain error by the trial court:
Lake City Code § 11.16.100 is valid. We conclude thus, we do not address his vagueness argument.
the facts before the trial court were sufficient to show 2. Defendant contends that section 11.16.100 does not
beyond areasonable doubt that defendant "engaged in define "sexual conduct," basing his argument on an
sexual conduct" within the meaning of the ordinance. interpretation of subsection C, governing intentional
Because we cannot determine as a matter of law from exposure of the genitals. However, "sexual conduct" is
defined by section 11.16.010, and because the trial court
the record whether defendant's conduct occurred in a could reasonably have found that sexual conduct occurred^
place "open to public view," we remand with we need not address defendant's argument regarding;
instructions that the trial court apply the legal subsection C.
standard set forth in this opinion. The trial court 3. We disagree with the dissent's conclusion that the
should then reaffirm or vacate defendant's conviction interpretation of the statutory language "in a place open to
depending on its determination whether or not the public view" in this disorderly conduct lewdness ordinance
should be drawn from decisions holding that Fourth
conduct occurred "in a place open to public view."
Amendment protection from unlawful search does not
attach to objects in plain view of apolice officer. While "[i]t
Judith M. Billings, Judge
has long been the law that objects falling within the plain
view of an officer from a position where he is entitled to be
are not the subject of an unlawful search," State v. Holden,
f 14
I CONCUR:
964 P.2d 318, 321 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v.
Lee,
633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981)), this case does not
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
challenge the legality of a search under the Fourtn
Amendment As the New York Court of Appeals noted in
BENCH, Judge (dissenting in part):
rejecting a similar argument: "plainly, the existence of a
|15
I agree with sections I and EL of the main diminished expectation of privacy [for Fourth Amendment
opinion. I disagree, however, with section HI because purposes] does not transform the interior of an automobile
I do not believe the trial court needs to redetermine into a 'public place.'" People v. McNamara, 585 N-E-2d?
whether this sexual conduct occurred "in a place open 788, 791 (N.Y. 1991) (interpreting term "public place">
The policy under the Fourth Amendment governing when
to public view."
Tfl 6
Although Utah courts have not interpreted an officer may search an automobile and the policy behind
this particular ordinance, we have had significant when disorderly conduct occurs "in a place open to public
experience in assessing what is open to public view. view" are entirely different. The former controls officer
conduct under the Fourth Amendment; the latter protects
In the search and seizure context, for example, we citizens from observing lewd private conduct Our
have consistently allowed officers to seize evidence interpretation comports with this policy difference and is
when the evidence is '"in open view from a position consistent with case lawfromour sister states.
lawfully accessible to the public.'" State v. Holden,
964 P.2d 318,321 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 982
P.2d 88 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Lee, 633 P.2d
48, 51 (Utah 1981)); see also State v. Belgard, 840
P.2d 819,823 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating that once
officer is in a place "lawfully accessible to the
public," officer is "free to observe whatever was in
his open view that might have been observed by any
other member of the general public").
Tf 17
It is undisputed that the officer in the instant
case saw defendant kiss the exposed breasts of the
woman he was with and he saw defendant's exposed
genitals. It is also undisputed that the officer
witnessed this sexual conduct from a place lawfully
accessible to any member of the general public-as he
stood in a public parking lot Given the well-accepted
standard in Utah case law regarding what it means to
be in a place open to public view, I see no need to
look to the case law of foreign jurisdictions. My
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the foreign
jurisdictions cited in the main opinion would import
a "likely [to be] seen by a casual passerby" standard,
which is required neither by the plain language of the
instant ordinance nor by the relevant Utah case law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
1[18
Accordingly, I would affirm
outright OCR,
the may contain errors.
Machine-generated

EXHIBIT B
Still Photos

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

EXHIBIT C
Information datedJuly 13, 1999

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Iiv THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

31

SALT LAKE CITY,
A Municipal Corporation

i 1 P n **'

vs.

INFORMATION

KEITH W ROBERTS

Court Case
Police Case 99136705

D.O.B. 08/29/42

Citation
Judge

DEFENDANT
OF UTAH
y and County of Salt Lake

9919/^2

tTE

ss.

E UNDERSIGNED of Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt Lake,
te of Utah on behalf of said City, on oath complains that the above
te defendant whose other and true name is to complainant unknown,
Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt Lake and State of Utah on or about
09/99 20:45, at Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt Lake and state
resaid did commit the public offense of
LATING THE SALT LAKE CITY CODE, as follows, to-wit:
T I: Disorderly Conduct
endant, while in a place open to public view, willfully; engaged in
ual conduct, alone or with another person or an animal; or, made an
entional exposure of his or her genitals, pubic area, buttocks or
portion of the areola and/or nipple of the female'breast. A Class
isdemeanor.
VIOLATION OF SALT LAKE CITY CODE, SECTION 11.16.100
counts located at approximately 900 W 1860 S

Complainant

JUL 13 1999

f'/W4
ity Prosecutor
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CITY COPY

SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE
MS

DPI

ROBERTS, KEITH W
ROBERTS,.KEITH WOOTTON

08/29/42

TIME

DATE BOOKED

I N C I D B ^ R E P O R T I N G W O ^ J;B00K1NG - N Q i S ^ SOgNC

07/10/99

0138 9913670b

ARREST DATE

TIME

07/09/99

204b 900 W 1860 S

991681b

232

ARREST LOCATION

ARRESTING OFFICER

OFFICER ID.

AGENCY

RUSSELL, A

17 b

SLC POLICE

DOCUMENT NO.

M CG DISORDERLY CONDUCT

NO. PRIOR E

2

BAIL OR SENTENCE

JUDGE

280.00

SL DIST

CLASS B

BOOKED BY

SHIFT SERGEANT

SEARCHED BY

FARRINGTON

PORTER, JAM POLLEI, LAU

CAS" -213 Z.«*P3| PRINTS 4

I23J

NEC NEG DWN

NEG
LAST PHOTl

07/1C

PROPERTY HELD IN EVIDENCE

CAR IMPOUND LOCATION

NONE

IWHITE

sum

CITY

PICTURE

SLCPD
$ggj$S£ij: i!fS!iSP!iGIS= I f l ^ ^ l l g S ^ ^ I - ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ i l B J ^ y y 8 ufi.NOr^S6iN

AGEss-•POBtgSl

SALE

NCIC

3 CARSD

39.bO
PROPERTY HELD BY

SLC POLICE

SHWL

OTHER

RECORDS CHECKED BY

b6 IOGDEN

6 0 0 1170 IBRN IBLU I b l 8 - b 0 - 7 2 1 2

VALID

LOCATION

DESCRIPTION

R/L HANDED

LEFT

MULTIPLE ON HAND

RIGHT I

LOWER

HAND

EYE GLASSES

Y
OCCUPATION

HOM^ADDRESS^^;

RETIRED

8b94S 300S

•^-.;

• V ^ ' f e ^ ^ S f f ^

MIDVALE, UT
RELATION S O N

EMERGENCY: NOTIFY (NAME ADDRESS)

ROBERT ROBERTS

ZIP ^

SAME, UT

SAME

GOVT. EMP.

EMPLOYED BY (NAME ADDRESS)

N O

ARRESTEES
CONDITION

NO
REMARKS

b62-2b2y
EMERG. PHONE NO.

SAME
WORK PHONE NO.

UNK

CONSOLIDATED FRT
| INTOX

["PMEPHONE N O I ^

SICK

NO

INJURED

NO

MED

EXPLAIN

NO SEE MEDICAL SCREENING REPORT
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1

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT IBQEB SRSTOCT €QU£T
Third Judicial District

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2

4

SALT LAKE CITY,

7

feWpwly£,lef&

Plaintiff,

5
6

OCT 2 5 1999

-oOo-

3

Case No. 991914252

vs.

TRIAL

KEITH W. ROBERTS,

(Videotape Proceedings'!

Defendant.

8

-oOo-

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day of
August, 1999, commencing at the hour of 4:52 p.m., the
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT, sitting as Judge in the
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that
the following videotape proceedings were had.
-oOo-

17

A P P E A R A N C E S

18
19

For the City:

RICHARD W. DAYNES
Salt Lake City Prosecutor
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

For the Defendant:

W. ANDREW McCULLOUGH
Attorney at Law
895 West Center Street
Orem, Utah
84057

20
21
22
23

FILED

24
25

OCT 2 7 1999

ORIGINAL

ALAN P SMITH CSR
385 BRAHMA ORIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107

COURT OF APP
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3
4

MR. DAYNES:

there's one matter remaining, that's the Keith Roberts.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. DAYNES:

7

THE COURT:

8

Yup.

Are you ready?

We are, your Honor.
Okay*

This is Salt Lake

City versus Keith Roberts, Case No. 991914252;

9
10

Your Honor, I guess

MR. DAYNESt

Your>Honorr maybe we

could address this at this time;

11

Mr. ^McCullough filed a trial memorandum which—

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. DAYNESr

Yeahf I've read it^
— i n my opinion is

14

basically A motion, looks' like*a motion to dismiss and^it

15

goes—

16

THE COURT

Well, the problem with

17

that, I don't-see any facts, I'd sure like to hear some

18

facts and then maybe he can argue his motion.-

19

MRC McCULLOUGHT

I intend ^ o make a

20

motion to^dismiss at the* end of their case, very

21

obviously, yout Honor,

22

^THE COURT:

23

MR: McCULLOUGH:

24
25

Okayi
But I can only

surmise at this point what the facts will show,
THE COURT:

Well, that's what I

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

assumed when you wrote this, that maybe I'd better hear

* I some testimony*
HR. DAYNES: And—and your Honor, as
4

far as whether this was—and I think the Issue An this

5

case "that Hr. McCullough has raised, is whether it's-a

* | public place or open<,to public view—
THE COURT:
MR; DAYNES:
9

Uh huh.
—and if that's all

we're going to be arguing on this.case, I * think that the

10

case.law itself would—would support—we could address

H

that issue right now and—and then go forward with—

12

THE .COURT: But I don't know uWhere it

13

occurred.

14

South.

15

in the middle ofkthe street, that's a different story*

All I have is an address; Ninth West and 1860

I don't know anything more than that.

If it*was

16 I if it were some place else, then I might view it .a little
17

18

hit differently.
MR. DAYNES: - If I--if I made a

19

proffer to the Court that the events,,and we're just

20

talking about whether the-law meets^this particular

21 J circumstance at this point „in time and I—and I would not
objgflt^ to going forward with the—with the evidence at
23 I that point in time; but if the only issue is whether an
24
25

individual in a car is open to public view—
THE COURT:

Well, in a place open to
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1

public view.

That's the language.

2

MR. DAYNES: Yes.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. McCULLOUGHx

All right.
I have some

5

questions I need to ask the observing officers, your

6

Honor.

7

need to ask those questions.

I don't think we'll take a long time at it, but I

8

THE. COURT: All right.

9

MR. DAYNES:

No objection,vyour

THE COURT:

That's okay, because

10

Let's—

Honor.

11
12

maybe when he tells us what he did and everything and

13

what went-on, it might impact all of us.

14
15

All right. -Call your first—how many witnesses
do you have?

Two or ^one?

16
17

MR.^DAYNES:

Two—two witnesses, your

Honor.

18

MR. McCULLOUGH:

I would move to

19

exclude,.your Honor? but" I' assume he'll say-whichever one

20

doesn't come up first is his assistant, so...

21
22

MR. DAYNES:
request—

23
24
25

We would—we would

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) your stuff,

Mr. McCullough.
MR. DAYNES:

—that Officer Player be

5
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1

our—our—

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. DAYNES:

4

THE COURT:

5

Bring him up here, let's get him sworn—sworn in.

6
7

MR. DAYNES:

Your helper?
—agent for the City.
Okay.

Call your -witness.

Call Officer Russell to

the stand.

8

ANTHONY RUSSELL.

9

called as a witness by and on .behalf of the City in this

10

matter; after having been- first duly swornf assumed the

11

witness ..stand, and was examined and. testified as follows:

12

DIRECT EXAMINATION

13

BY MR. DAYNES:

14

Q

Please state your full name.

15

A

Anthony Russell.

16

Q

Spell your last .name.

17

A

R-u-s-s-e-1-1.

18

Q

Officer Russell, you are employed with the Salt

19

Lake City Police Department; is that correct?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

And how long have you been with the City Police

22

Department?

23

A

Over five years, now.

24

Q

What is your assignment as a police officer?

25

A

Right now, undercover vice.
6
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1

Q

How long have you been -in the vice squad?

2

A

A year.

3

Q

Turning your attention to July 9th of this

4

year, 1999, approximatelyr I guess-8:00 p.m., 8:45 in the

5

evening, can you tell me what events transpired around

6

that—that -date—

7

A

Sure.

8

Q,

—that time.

9

A

We were working south State Street where the

10

majority of our prostitutes are and I recognized one

11

prostitute that we've'.dealt with numerous times.

12

Q

Can you tell me the name of ..that prostitute?

13

A

It's Helba.

14

names.

15

Sanders.

16
17

She goes by a lot of different

She—I think her real name is Melba—Melba

Q

And this Melba Sanders,- you—you've-dealt with

her on previous^ prostitute^—

18

A

Hh .huh;

19

Q

—busts?

20

A

Uh huh*

21

Q

How many times?

22

A

Oh, I—I don't know.

23
24
25

We have a file on her

back at our place, I don't know how many times.
Q

But it's been more than one occasion; is that

correct?

7
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1

A

Yeah.

Yeah,

I mean, we stop and talk to them

2

quite "often and arrest .them and all that kind of stuff,

3

so yeah, quite a few times.

4
5

®

Q

You saw her on State Street .at that particular

time? can you tell me what happened as you observed her?
A

Yeah.

I was—I parked across the street so she

7

couldn't see .me and I watched sixer ^approach several cars

8

and I watched her get into-a car, ,and-we followed it. ,

9 J
10

Q

flow

many cars did she approach before she

finally got into one?

11

A

r think it was three. Threes

12

Q

What did you do, after you observed .her .^get into

13

this last vehicle?

14

A

We followed it;.

15

Q

What—

16

:A

In fact*, theret-was; three vice officers .onf>at

17

that time, so we—we followed it* rotated the tail.

18

Q

What kind of car**was it that she got into?

19

A

I believe it was a—what do you call it, has a

20

bed in it?

21

Q

And what—

22

A

It may be a truck•

23

Q

But do you remember what color it was?

24

A

It was a dark color, I believe.

25

El Camino-type cary I believe.

I believe it

was a blue-, but I'm just trying, to figure. We deal with

8
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J so many cars, I —
p

Q

You're not sure exactly what-color:of*car--

A

No, I'm not sure.

Q

— o r what kind of car it was,^but you *do

q I
°

f

5

remember following a vehicle at that time?

6

A

Oh, yeah.

7

Q

Okay.

*H

A

It first went over to the area of 1300 South

Uh huh.

Where did that vehicle go to?

9
10 I 500 West underneath the viaduct.

11

Q

And what did it do at that location?

12

A-

Well, that's—that's one of our more popular

13

places where we catch prostitutes and so we set u p —

14

there's only one way you can come out of there and the

15

car went in there> or started to go that way and we

16

noticed—I noticed - a .marked unit drive by;, I think it
spooked them, I don't know for sure, but it turned back

17

I around and went back -over the viaduct.

18

I

19

I eventually pull over?*
A
Ninth West and 1860 South, I believe it was.
It's behind a — a bar there.

20
21
22

I

Q

Q

And where did you eventually—where did it

Is it—is that located within the venue of Salt

Lake Gity, Utah?
24
25

I

A

Yes.

It is.

Q

What did you do at that point in time?
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A

We actually parked in front xzf the bar so they

2
couldn't see our car and^wesnuck around on foot^oand
3

approached the car on foot.
Q

5
6

observe the vehicle?
A

Yes.

Q

Was—as this an area that's~open to public

A

Yes.

'
8
9
10 J

11

Did—did you come to ^a point where you Could

view?

tolthe--the bar.

It^s the back—it's-the.back parking lot
The bar sits—I don't know if you want

me to draw*itf but the bar-sits on Ninth West, with a
12

parking lot that goes all the **ay around it and then

^3

there£s~a business back there with some flat-bed trucks,

14

but there's no fence or^anything.

15
16

17
1

8

19

-Q

Why don^t you go ahead and use the—the board

here?
MR. DAYNES:

Your Honor, may I

approach the witness?
THE COtJRT:

You may.

20
21
22

Q
(By Mr. Daynes) Maybe you ought to .draw in
some marks tinaudible)
MR. McCULLOUGH: Is one of these

23

cameras going to get this, your Honor?

24
25

THE COURT:

No.

He/ll have to draw

it and then we'll have him describe what he's drawn.

10
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1

MR. McCULLOUGH:

2

THE WITNESSi

Okay.

I'll try and do ±t

°

fast.* -Here's 900 West, there's a bar right here, the

4

Office Lounge, and this would be^west -this way.

5

a building right back here, the side street—this is all

°

the lot and there's parking^back^here and*, there was a

7

truck, a flat-bed truck parked right here.

8

little (inaudible) right here (inaudible)

9

10

I

*Q

(By Mr. Daynes)

There's

And this is a

Could you give me another

color of marker there?

11

Using a different-colored marker,, could you

12

indicate where their vehicle was when they pulled into

13

that lot?

14

^

A

Their car—they tpuHed tin and came i n and

parked r i g h t about here.

16

Q-

You—

1

A

This is (inaudible)

Q

Again, this is a—this building that you got

M

18
19

just above 900 West, what is that?

20

A

This is the Office Lounge (inaudible)

21

Q

oh.

22

A

(Inaudible) bar.

2

3

Q

Okay.

2

*

25

And this lot: that you've designated

would be slashed line, that's the parking lot for that
bar?

11
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1

I

A

Yeah.

But—yeah.

This is all a^lot and it's

all kind of open so you can park in-Jiere^ you.can park
8

I back here.

4

Q

5

So anybody can,walk, into^that area, right into

that area?

8

A

Yeah.

In fact* we walked—we parked right here

7

and we walked this way all the way back into this area,

8

into this section.

And I believe—I'm not sure about the

9 J officer, but I believe another officer was right about in
10

i this area.

"I'M
12
13

Q

Yeah, this is all opei**

What happened when you approached the vehicle?

What is it that you saw?
J

A.

Actually, what I did is, I—this is a flat-bed

14 I truck and the cab of it was*right here, so 1 underneath—
15 I underneath the flat-bed truck,,. came up so I was in a
16
17
18

19

position right about \ there*.
Q

So at this point in time, you're on the other

side of the truck?
A

Uh huh.

20

THE COURT: .You need.to get up and,

21

just kind of describe that on the record for us to make

22

sure we get a good record of^it, okay?

23

THE WITNESS: Okay.

24

THE COURT:

25

Just come on up here and

speak--
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1

THE WITNESS: Oh. JJpjfaere?

2

THE COURT: . Yeah.

3

We need to get you

on camera;-

4

THE WITNESS: Sorxy<

5

THE COURT: Xt doesnft—

6

THE WITNESSr -Okay..

7

THE COURT:

8

behind him and I think get a shot of it.

9

THE WITNESS:

10
11

that, your Honor?
THE COURT:

Yeah.. Just cdescribe now

what you've drawn there.

14
15

Okay.

HR. DAYNES: Would you like me to do

12
13

We can pull that -.back

THE WITNESS:

Okay.

X^ve drawn Ninth

West and the Office Lounge, the bar, is the big—

16

rHE COURT:

Move it a little more

17 ; this way.
18

THE WITNESS:

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

This—

Okay. How, what I'm

20

going to try to do is get the camera on you, so talk real

21

loud,~okay?

22

THE WITNESSz

23

THE COURT:

24
25 !

ahead.

Okay.
All right.

We're—go

Describe.
THE WITNESS:

Okay.

The Office

13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Lounge is this box right here, the lower one, closest to
Ninth West.

Up here is another building and surrounding

the Office Lounge is open parking lot or an open lot.
Parked right there, and the big black box was a flat-bed
truck and just to the west of that in the blue that I've
highlighted is where the suspect—the A.P. parked his
car.

The blue here designates my routd that I walked on

foot.
MR. DAYNES:

Okay.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

switch back to our four-vay modeMR. DAYNES:
Q

I'm just going to

All right.

Thank you, your Honor.

(By Mr. Daynes) 'Now, you eventually did

approach this vehicle?
A

Yes.

I did.

Q

The first—the *first—-before you got to the

vehicle, what did you see?
A

What I saw is, wfeen I was standing right there,

I was approximately 15 to 20 ie&t -away and I could see
into the back -window.
How graphic do you want: me— <
Q

Better go ahead and—

A

I'll try and b e —

Q

All the details.
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1

A

Okay.

She was sitting in the passenger^seat

2

turned toward him.

3

her breasts.

4

breasts, okay, and that's when I approached the car from

5

the back.

6
7

Q

I saw her lift her shirt, exposing

I .saw the driver put ,his;jwmfch to sher

Now, you've mentioned you saw the driver; do

y C u see the drivei in the courtroom today?

8

A

Yesi

9

*Q

Would you identify where he is at?

10
11 I
12

I do*

wearing?
&

Ke's^sittinq at the defendant's table in a

cowboy shirt and^blue Levis, brown shirt.

13

MR. DAYNES:

14

THE WITNESS:

15

MR* DAYNES:

16

19
20

your Honor, l e t —
Next to his attorney.
—-let the record.reflect

t b ^ witness has identified the defendant?

17
18

What he's

THE COURT:
Q

(By Mr. Daynes)

It may.

As you approached; the vehicle,

did you—did^youi,notice anything else?
A

I approached the vehicle on the passenger side,

2A \ i came down this way.
22
23

Q

Were you, still outside of the vehicle at this

point in time?

24

A

Am 13

25

@

Yes.
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1

A

Yeah.

I didn't—J mever went inside -the

2

vehicle, but yeah? and I went up to her window and

3

knocked on the window, with my -badge out and identified

4

myself.

5
6
7

Q

What could you see from the outside of the

vehicle?
A

Her shirt was still up and his pants~were down,

8

his penis exposed.

9

like--

10

Q

11

He was doing up his pants at the—

Did you Mirandize—did you—did you actually

arrest -these individuals?

12

&

Yes. . I did.

13

1Q

Did ^you Mirandize' each of them?

14

A

I Mirandized her.

15

Q

Okay.

16

defendant?

17

A

I believe Officer Player did.

18

Q

You didn't hear what the officer was with

19

And did—did anybody else Mirandize the

Officer Playerr though?

20

A

No.

21

Q

This area that you were at* where you were

I didn't.

22

looking into the vehicle, that's an area that anybody

23

from the public,'from the bar, anybody could—could walk

24

back in that location and—

25

A

Yes.
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1

Q

*

—and anybody could Jiave Been the event that

you had seen?

q |

°

A

Yes.

I meanf stJiey jwere-r:they^werersomewhat

4

hidden from this truck* T mean, they7re not going to go

5

park, you know, in .someone's driveway; but while we were

6

interviewing them after, right in here:there^wascnum^rous

7

people coming .from the bar and getting into their trucks

8

and leaving^ so this gave them ^a^little—this flat bed

9

J gave them,a little bit iof .hiding:room, but yeah, you can

10
11
12

walk back there, just like I did^
right; here.Q

18
14

And other people could have—from the bar,

could Jiave been^in that location as well?
A

0h, yes. Yeah.

15
16

MB. .DAYNES^ No further tjuestions at
this time, your Honor.

17
18
19

People were parked

CROSS-EXAMINATION *
BY MR: McCULLOUGH:
Q

The actual best way, Officer, to get close to

20

that^vehicle without disturbing ^anybody "in advance is to

21

crawl under the truck though; is that right?

22

that'.s -the only real way you could get at .them * was to

23

crawl under the truck?

I*-mean,

24

A

No.

25

Q

Well, then why did-you crawl under the truck?
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1
2

A

So they—so-1Aey wouldn't«\see me^

Q

All right.

So, if you had come there without

3

crawling under the truck, you would liave been afraid that

4

they would have seen * you?

5

A

Well, yeah.

6

Q

And might have stopped what they were doing?

7

A

Yeah.

8

Q

Which is what they were legally required to do

9 [ if the public came to watch; correct?

10

A

11
12

Z -don't think you can be

I don't think so.

exposing yourself in public—
I

Q

Officer—

13

A

--at any time.

14

Q,

— i n your police report, you've talked about,

15

quote, behindwa .couple of parked flat-bed trucks; Where's

16

the other one?

17

I

A

I don't—there "may-have been another one here.

I just remember the one.
19 I
20

21

Q

-All righto

So there may .have been another one

between that bar and—and the defendant?
A

No.

If—if anything^ it was right here,

22

because there was cars that were coming, that were

2

3

backing out.

2

4

was a truck that backed up and left but, I don't know,

2

5

there may have been another one here, I'm not sure.

There's more room in here than that.
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There

1
2

THE COURT:. Yeah.
isn't:to.scale.

3

THE WITNESS:

4

MR. McCULLOHGH:

5

I jrecognize^that

Q

(By Mr, McCullough)

Okay.
All right.

Now, you said there w a s —

6

there '.s another building.

7

a — a block.and that's a building; is rthat right?

Up there in your W, you have

8

k

Yes.

9

Q

Do you^know what the* building is?

10

A,

I have no-idea^

It is.

Cement wall or like a cinder

11

block wall.

12

Q

How high?

13

A

I guess maybe two - stories^ maybe kind of the

14

warehouse type?

15

Q

No windows?:

16

A

Don't know.

17

Q

So nobody, as^far as you can tell, could have

18

sat in the back of that building,to the west there and

19

looked out the window and seen this?

20

A

No.

21

Q

'Cause there's a blank wall, two*stories high?

22

A

Let me—there is a road that comes right here.

23

Q

By all means, if you- need to draw some other

24
25

stuff, draw it.

A

There's a — a road that comes right in this way
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I and there's a—an entrance^into this-right here—not an
entrance, but a, you know]; a driveway.
3

'

*Q

But that wall—

4

A

This road is right there,

5

Q

That building has a blank two-story wall

°

without windows?

7

A

8
9

I can't—I don't know.

I don't recall any

windowsr but there may be.
J

Q

All right.

Now, what about to the—to my left,

10

your right of the—of * the ^-drawing, you just draw a

11

squiggly 1 Tire "there.

12

A

Right <iiere?

13

Q

Yeah.

*4

A

T

What's—what's in that area?

don't know.. I believe -this is a chain link

15

fence right here, I believe it's chain link <all the way

16

around for the businesses, but I'm not sure.

17

Q

All right.

18

A

Yeah.

19

Q

Yeah.

20

A

No.

21

Q

okay.

So people coming, out of the bar?

22

A

Yeah.

In the parking lot.

23

Q

All right.

24
25

Did you see anybody over there?

Over on the, other side of the fence?

I saw people in the parking lot.

Any *of them crawl under the truck

to see what was going on?
A

No.
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1

Q

And—=and you give me a strange look. - That7 in

2

fact,-.would be .a.fairly strange* thing for people to do,

3

wouldn't it? . To crawl under a truck.to^.see whaf.s going

4

on?

5

A

If you're not a vice officery*-maybe.

6

Q

Officer, did you think in any manner that this

7

defendant was attempting to show off his penis in public?

8

Trying to show the—the public what—what a nice one he

9

had?

10

A

I think he -was picking up a prostitute

11

Q

That's what you think, but you don't have any

12

evidence of that one,, do you?

13

A

Actually^ I have her—her—

14

Q

Yeah.

15

A

No.

16

Q

All right.

But she's not here, is she?

But I*:faave her interview withe me.

17

MR. McCULLOUGH:

18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

That's all.

REDIRECT'EXAMINATION
BY MR. PAYNES:
Q

You can get^ into this area-without having to

climb under rthe truck; isn't that correct?

A

Oh> yeah.

You can walk this way, you can come

this way, you can come down this way.
Q

There's—there's lots of ways of get into that

location and there's—and—and there are peopl-e that!are
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1

constantly going in and out of t h i s parking l o t while
you're there; i s n ' t that correct?

3
'

A

Yeah.

There was "two—yeah,.-two or three cars

5 I (inaudible) the parking—the lot while .we were there.

MR.-DAYNES:

6

No further questions,

your Honor.

7

THE COURT:
8

Okay.

You can step down.

Thank you, sir.

&
10 I

r'm assuming you don't have anything more?
MR. McCULLOUGH:

11

Nothing further,

your Honor.
12

[

13

i Player to-the s t a n d .

14

I

MR^ DAYNES:

C i t y would -call .Officer

SHAWN PLAYER.

15 | called as a witness by and on behalf of the City in this
matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the
17

witness stand and was examined and testified as follows:

18

DIRECT EXAMINATION

19

BY MR. DAYNES:

20

Q

Please state' your full name.

21

A

Shawn Player.

22

q

spell your last name.

23

A

P-1-a-y-e-r.

24

Q

officer—

25

MR. McCULLOUGH:

Your Honor, could I
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1

ask him to spell his first name, too?

2

unusual—there's all kinds of ways to spell it.

3

THE WITNESS:

4

MR; HcCULLOUGH:

5

Q

(By Mr. Daynes)

Shawn is a—is an

S-h-a-w-n.
Thank you.

Officer Player, you are

6

employed with the Salt Lake City Police Department? is

7

that correct?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

How long have*~you been-^with the City Police

10

Department?

11

A

.Eive years *

12

Q

And you-are also assigned to the»~vice divisionr

13

is =^that correct?

14

A

Correct.

15

Q

You were part of this same incident or part of

16

the same bust on the—=July the* 9th, 1999; is that

17

correct?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And-turning your attention -to- that, were you in

20

the vehicle with Officer Russell?

21

A

No.

22

Q

You were in a different vehicle?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

But you did come to the same scene; is that

25

!

correct?
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1

I

A

Yes.

1

Q

And what happened when you arrived at that

2
o I

°
4

location?
A

I parked in front of the Office Lounge, as did

5

Officer Russell.

6

Office Lounge and we -could see the vehicle with the

7

individuals in it on the other side of.the flat-bed, a

8

flat-bed-trailer.

9
10 I

We walked down the north side of the

We walked up to the edge of the building,

11

watched -them?for a few minutes^ and then approachedJthe

12

trailer, ?stood behind the trailer.

13

of the trailer*whichf at the time, was pointing south/ so

14

I walked from a position here with Officer Russell to

I walked to the front

this position here, as Officer Russell walked, snuck
15
16

17
18

underneath the flat-bed to the other si#e^
Q

Now, you said that there is—that the trailer

was pointing south?
A

Well, if I remember correctly—it was a flat-

19

bed, so it^was actually irrelevant .to the way it was it

20

wasvpointing.

21
22
23
24
25

Q

So you, at that point in time, did you walk up

to the vehicle?
A

No.

I walked up to the front of the trailer*

i W as the other officer that Detective Russell was
talking about,
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1I
2

Q

-<?r that point of the trailer?

3
4

what did you see from th£ front of the—of the-

A

I saw the top of the defendant's-car and two

h^ads.

5

Q

Could you see what was going on?

6

A

No.

7

Q

when you got closer, could you see what—what

8

w #s

occurring in the vehicle?

9
10
^

A

No.

Because by the time I got up there,

Detective Russell had already approached and announced
| himself

12
13

From where I -was at* I "could not.

as a

Q

police officer.

you spoke with the defendant in this case, ttr.

Roberts, is that correct?

14

&

Yes..

15

Q

Did you give him his Miranda rights?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

And did-he agree to speaK with-you?

18

A

-No. He said he did not want to talk.

19

Q

okay-

20
21

0ther

I did.

This area around the vehicle, it's--

cars could park in that same and -similar location;

is that correct?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

And—and did you see other people coming out of

24
25

the bar?
A

Yes.
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I

<i

A n d going t o t h e i r cars?

A

Y e s . Several.

Q

A n d t h i s — t h i s p a r k i n g l o t is a p a r t o f that

2
3
1
4

J bar .parking lot?
Yes.
5
6
'

MR* D A Y N E S :

N o further q u e s t i o n s a t

this"time*

8

MR. McCULLOUGH:

I t h i n k I h a v e only«

® I one, your Honor.
10 !
11

CROSS-EXAMINATION

I BY MR. M c C U L L O U G H ;

12 J
13
14

Q

O f f i c e r , w h y w a s i t that y o u followed t h e s e

people in t h e first place?
A

Because t h e — t h e o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l i n t h e car T ^

15 I M e l b a , i s a known prostitute, w h i c h I h a v e p e r s o n a l l y
1® I picked u p a n d arranged f o r a deal w i t h s e x a n d t h e n
1

?

arrested h e r after I identified myself as^an o f f i c e r ,

1

8

w h i c h i s standard p r o c e d u r e .

19

Q

*Thank y o u .

20

MR. McCULLOUGH:

21

THE COURT:

22 J

MR. DAYNES:

23

That's all.

Y o u c a n step d o w n .
A t this timer t h e City

would rest, your Honor.

24 I

THE COURT:

Okay.

25

MR. McCULLOUGH:

Mr. McCullough?
Your H o n o r , I
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1
2
3
4
5

suspect we will know that the City suspects that
something went on there that they can't prove, that there
was a commercial deal for sex, which is in violation of
State and local statutes.
It/s not what they're charging because they

6

don't have any^evidence and they don't have any witness

7

to that, so they search like crazy and they come out with

^

anything they can and they pull up a—an ordinance that's

9 I designed to prohibit public indecency, public exposure
10

and they say, well, if you crawl under a truck, you can

^ I see these guys and if you walk up and look right through
12

I the window and tap on it, you can tell that he has his

13

I penis exposed*

An officer several feet away looking at—

14

around the truck, can only see the top of the vehicle and

15

a couple of heads.

16

The memorandum, I think, speaks for itself.

17

This is not the—the—this is not the—the—the type of

18

crime that the statute is designed to prohibit.

19

realize the State—the City's desperation and—and you

20

know, maybe they'll do better next time and—and maybe my

21

client will be smarter next time; but I suspect, your

I

22

J Honor, that what really we have here is somebody who

23

I says, you know, maybe I want to get to know this girl a

24

I little better, one way or another, and we need to get out

25

of public viewr 'cause that's not proper in public^
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I

And he <jets out of public view and somebody who

2
thinks they know something, crawls under a truck to get a
1
4
5

better view.

They still aren't able to see what they

need to see r by crawling under the truck, so he has to go
J up there and actually knock on the window and that's the
time when he sees the exposed private parts.

7

That's—I think we're wasting an awful lot of

*

time and money*

9
10 I

THE COURT:
MR. DAYNES:

11

Anything you want to say?
I do, your Honor.

As to the defendant's motionf

the charge of

^ J disorderly conduct, the defendant, while in a place open
13
to public -view, engaged in sexual conduct or made an

14

intentional exposure of his or her genitals, pubic area

15

or (inaudible) and then it goes on to some other items•

16

The items that we're talking about is, engaged
"^ j in sexual conduct or intentionally exposed himself,
18 | we've proved both of those, actually.

This particular

19 j location^is a public parking lot, is the parking lot
20

I that's designated—

21 I

THE COURTr

Well, but are we talking

22 I about -public place or something open to public view?
23 I

MR. DAYNES:

And—and I was going to

24

get to that, your Honor.

What I—the reason I brought up

25

that was not that they were actually in the parking lot
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^

1

in a public place doing this, but they were in an area

2

that was open to the public view.

3

walking up to their cars in the parking lot; in fact,

4

Officer Russell wasn't all the way up to the car, he was

People could be

5

back by the truck when he first saw the defendant engage

6

in behavior where'he was actually apparently kissing the-

7

-the breasts of the—of this other woman that was in the

®

vehicle with thim. He could see that from—before he even

9 I got^to the car.
10

It wasn't up until he got next to the car when

11

he in fact saw that not only was he engaged—he was

12

engaged in that conduct, but he was engaged, he had h i s —

^3

his—his genitals exposed with his pants undone.

14

J

Based on that, your Honor, the City has proven

15

and—that this is open to public view, which is different

16

than"toeing—something being done in a public place

17
1

J

I could see if—if Mr. McCullough was—was

^ I arguing that this was done in an open place, in a—in a

19 I public place, that maybe you could claim that—
20

THE COURT:

Well, see, I would take

21

the different view.

22

parking lot, doing it, that, in my mind, is a public

23

place-and they ought not to be doing it and they have no

24

rights.

25

If they were at Sugarhouse Park in a

That's my view.
MR. DAYNES:

Where they're in any
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public parking lot—
2

THE COURT:

Well, that's the point.

q f
4

MR. DAYNES:
It^SiOpen to public view.

5

THE COURT:

—committed that crime.

I think—I think the

6

problem^is^that the language is tough to deal with, but

7

I'm not ^oing to struggle with it too much.

8

public parking JLot, in my view, it wasjopen to public

9
10
11
12

v

igg*

I know Mr. McCullough takes a different viewpoint

than I do, but I'm going'to deny his motion.
Are iyou going to call any witnesses, Mr.
McCullough?

13

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. DAYNES:

"16
17

It was a

No, your Honor.

Okay.

Anything else?

Would you like closing

argument, your Honor?
THE COURT:

No.

I think I heard

18

enough unless—I mean, I think—I think Mr. McCullough is

1

trying to make a legal argument here on the elements of

20

the offense and he doesn't think it fits.

9

21

i guess it all depends on how you want to

22

interpret what a place open to public view is.

23

if you're in a public parking lot, it's a place open to

2

public view because you have the public moving around in

4

25

I think

and out of the building and into the parking lot.
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1

I

*
3

MR. DAYNES:

We would submit it, your

Honor*
'

4

MR. McCULLOUGH:

Sounds like the

Court's made up its mind, your Honor.

5

THE COURT:

I'm—

Yes, I have.

Your

®

argumentiis well taken, Mr. McCullough, but I view it a

7

little bit ^differ exit ly than you do on .behalf of your

®

client*

1'ia going to find him guilty at this time.

9 [

What's your pleasure?

10
11

ilR. McCULLOUGH:

We'd just as soon,

your Honor—just a second.

12

We'd.*just as soon go ahead, your Honor, as the

13

Court may^not be surprised to hear, we'll ask the Court

14

to stay any sentence because we will be asking for a

15

second, third and fourth opinion.

16
17

THE COURT:

That will probably be

good.

18

MR. McCULLOUGH:

While the Court^may

19

be aware, or may or may not be aware, that I'm also legal

20

counsel for the Utah Nature Society and I tell my clients

21

that if they—if they make efforts to stay away that they

22

have complied .with the law and—and I've got to make sure

23 I of that.
24

25

THE COURT:

And that may or may not

be right.
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1

MR- JMcCULLOUGH:

And I—well, I've

2

got "to make sure that—that the law is not expanded

3

unduly and that'& something I have to do.

4

THE COURT:

I can understand that.

5

J

6

' 60-days in* jail; jsaaspend the jail time.

Okay*

What I'm going to do is sentence him to
In lieu of a

7

fine; I maxtt him to,perform 30 hours of community

8

service,. 12 months* good JDehavior probation.

9

J

10

MR. McCULLOUGH:

Your Honor, I'm

filing a notice of appeal.

11

May ^we;suspend—I—I'm—I'm very concerned,

12

obviously, ^aboute*moving -it, so may we suspend the 30

13

hours community service upon filing the notice of appeal?

14

I

THE COURT:

Yeah.

Pending the

^ J appeal.
MR. McCULLOUGH:
17

Obviously.

Yes, of course,

We'll have it filed by tomorrow, your Honor.

18

THE COURT:

Well, that'll be fine.

19

THE CLERK:

Just for record-keeping,

20
21
22
23

24 I

how long to do the community service?
THE COURT:

Oh, let's see.

We'll

give^him three* months.
^Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

* **

25
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1

TRANSCRIBERS CERTIFICATE

2

STATE OF UTAH

)

3

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

•

4
5
6
7
8
9

10

ss.

I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify:
That I.am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith,
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court
Transcriber of Tape,Recorded Court .Proceedings; that I
received an electronically recorded videotape of the
within matter and under his supervision have transcribed
the same into typewriting, and the foregoing pages,
numbered from 1 to 32, inclusive, to the best of my
ability constitute a full, true and correct
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.

12

I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this*suit^

13

Dated at Salt Lake Cityf Utah, this 17th day of

11

14

October, 1999.

15
16

17
18

Transcriber

19

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day
20
21

of October, 1999*

22

NOTARY PUBLIC
ALAN P. SMITH
385 BRAHMA DRIVE
MURRAY, UT 84107
COMMISSION EXPIRES
DEC.4. 2001
STATE OF UTAH

23
24
25

Notary Public

( S E A L )
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1
2
3

REPORTERS CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

•
)

4

ss •

I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter,

5

Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape

6

Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of

7

Utah, do certify that I received electronically recorded

8

videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be

9

transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing

10

pages, numbered from 1 to 32, inclusive, to the best of

11

my knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct

12

transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape

13

Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.

14

I do further certify that I am not counsel,

15

attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or

16

stenographer of either party or of the attorney at teither

17

party, or otherwise interested in the event of this «u±t.

18

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 19th day of

19

October, 1999.

20
NOTARY PUBLIC
ALAN P. SMITH
385 BRAHMA DRIVE
MURRAY, UT 84107
COMMISSION EXPIRES

21
22

LL

3EC. 4, 2001

Notary Pub>lic

TATE OF UTAH
8TA

23
(

S E A L )

24
25
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Third District Court, State of Utah
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
450 South State Street, PO. Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 1860
SENTENCE/JUDGMENT/ORDER
Criminal/Traffic
Case Number

Plaintiff

feTATE

9 9 / q / ^ *? 3

Tape number

-VS-

C#

Date 9- -<36 -<? 9

Ht=-i rH

6FP.-PS,

Judge/Comm WILLIAM W. BARRETT

U)
Defendant

./

Time

Clerk

mnu(2j/--

Plaintiff Counsel.

/.

Defense Counsel.

jreter.
3 f i F S ^ " D \Sfr>oo&CLiu/

C

OKinrj^rr

Amended
Amended _____

COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS:
ail

loO

OPr^fS

bo

Suspended

)efendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence
:

ine Amt. $

r

QMS

_
Fee$.

Susp. $

Fine Bal $.
TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $

per month/1 st Pmt. Due

Payment Schedule: Pay $_
Dourt Costs

Last Pmt. Due

$

Community Service/WP
destitution

*3c>

$

\AO* LO<

through

Crucr-

11-36-9^

Pay to: • Court • Victim • Show Proof to Court

\ttorney Fees $
D

robation \ $L mrj/uru*
Terms of probation:

Q'Good Behavior D AP&P • ACEC

^ N o Further Violations

• Other

• Counseling thru

3 AA Meetings

/ wk

/ month • Classes

U Follow Program

• In/Out Treatment.

3 No Alcohol
• Antibuse

• Health Testing
• Crime Lab Procedure

• Employment

•
„ ^J? **** •€>

• Proof of
Plea in Abeyance Diversion
Review

/

/

4'&*

*>/&

at

>mpliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
ing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
and services) during this proceeding
should call Third District
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
t at 238-7391, at least three working days prior to the
proceeding OCR, may contain errors.
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